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 NEITHER EMPLOYEES NOR INDENTURED 
SERVANTS: A NEW AMATEURISM FOR A 
NEW MILLENNIUM IN COLLEGE SPORTS 




No word engenders more controversy among academics who study  
college sports than “amateurism.”  According to the National Collegiate  
Athletic Association (NCAA), the premier governing body for college sports in 
the United States, amateurism is the cornerstone of its philosophy of athletic 
governance.1  That philosophy has spawned what the NCAA terms “the  
collegiate model of sports,” within which “the young men and women  
competing on the field or court are students first, athletes second.”2   
Amateurism, as the NCAA envisions it, prohibits college athletes from 
 
1.  signing a contract with a professional team in their  
collegiate sport; 
2.  receiving a salary for playing their collegiate sport; 
3.  receiving prize money in excess of actual and  
reasonable expenses; 
4.  playing in games with professional athletes; 
5.  trying out for, practicing with, or competing with a  
professional team; 
6.  receiving “[b]enefits from an agent or prospective 
agent”; 
                                                 
* Professor, Vermont Law School.  J.D., Indiana University-Bloomington, 1987; Ph.D., Miami  
University (Ohio), 1979; B.A., University of Rhode Island, 1974. 
1. Amateurism, NCAA.ORG, http://www.ncaa.org/amateurism (last visited June 9, 2016). 
2. Id.  The NCAA uses the term “student-athlete,” which I will not use because it originated to help 
colleges avoid workers’ compensation liability for injured athletes after the adoption of athletic  
scholarships and because it separates athletes from their classmates, who are not called  
“student-musicians” or “student-journalists.”  This Article will instead refer to “college athletes” or 
“athletes” and will use the terms synonymously. 
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7.  agreeing to representation by an agent; and 
8.  “[d]elay[ing] initial full-time colleg[e] enrollment to 
participate in organized sports competition.”3 
 
Lincoln Allison, a British academic who has studied amateurism  
extensively, explains that “a human activity is amateur in so far as it is chosen 
in order to enrich experience and that choice is not coerced by economic or 
social forces.”4  By Professor Allison’s definition, amateurism lives on in  
American college sports today, not only in the NCAA’s Division III, where  
athletic scholarships are prohibited and athletes usually do not envision careers 
in professional sports, but sometimes even in Division I, which features the 
NCAA’s most competitive and commercialized athletic programs.  On the 
women’s crew team at the University of Oklahoma, for example, forty-nine of 
the seventy members seek synchronization in the early-morning chill, day after 
day, without the benefit of an athletic scholarship.5  
Despite the remaining outposts of traditional amateurism, by the 1990s, in 
the wake of million-dollar salaries for coaches, almost constant expansion and 
upgrading of athletic facilities, and burgeoning revenues from licensing  
collegiate products, “amateurism had come to seem” in Professor Allison’s 
words “outdated, inefficient and reactionary”; it was, he observes, “thoroughly 
tainted by elitism and hypocrisy.”6  Therefore, “the generation [of journalists] 
in power in the 1990s seemed to accept its demise where they did not actually 
despise it.”7   
The elitism associated with amateurism is evident in what Professor Allison 
terms the Roger Bannister Syndrome, which refers to the lanky, articulate young 
physician and Oxford graduate who was the first person to run a mile in under 
four minutes.8  At the heart of this syndrome, Allison writes,  
 
is the image of the gentleman athlete, as amateur and as  
honest as the day is long, an educated man with an income from 
another profession, exhausting himself to run faster than  
anybody had run before, as Bannister did to become the first 
runner to complete the mile in under 4 minutes at Oxford in 
                                                 
3. Id. 
4. LINCOLN ALLISON, AMATEURISM IN SPORT: AN ANALYSIS AND A DEFENCE 10 (2001). 
5. Eric Snyder, Amateurism and Intercollegiate Athletics, HIGHEREDJOBS (Sept. 16, 2014), 
https://www.higheredjobs.com/articles/articleDisplay.cfm?ID=560. 
6. ALLISON, supra note 4, at 13. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. at 37. 
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1953.9   
 
Amateurism’s distaste for commercialism restricted athletics to athletes whose 
personal or family finances permitted them to train and compete without the 
need to profit from their athletic labors. 
The hypocrisy that amateurism can produce has been a favorite subject of 
American journalists and legal commentators for a generation or more, and the 
critiques continue unabated today.  For example, prominent journalist and  
historian Taylor Branch characterizes amateurism as a “cynical hoax[], [a]  
legalistic confection[] propagated by the universities so they can exploit the 
skills and fame of young athletes.  The tragedy at the heart of college sports,” 
Branch writes, “is not that some college athletes are getting paid, but that more 
of them are not.”10  To illustrate the hypocrisy of amateurism, Branch told the 
story of A.J. Green, a former wide receiver at the University of Georgia, who 
“confessed that he’d sold his own jersey from the Independence Bowl the year 
before, to raise cash for a spring-break vacation.”11  Green’s penalty from the 
NCAA was a four-game suspension, but “[w]hile he served the suspension,” 
Branch relates, “the Georgia Bulldogs store continued legally selling replicas of 
[his] . . . jersey for $39.95 and up.”12  The implicit conclusion here, of course, 
is that if athletic commerce is good for the goose (the university), it should also 
be good for the gander (the athlete). 
Legal academics have echoed Branch, although in more precise legal  
language.  One recent commentary criticizes the NCAA’s rule prohibiting the 
payment of athletes beyond their athletic scholarships, claiming the rule “is  
illegal because it prevents its members from engaging in competitive ‘bidding’ 
to recruit student-athletes.”13  Another commentary argues that NCAA  
proscriptions against paying athletes “violate the federal antitrust laws because 
they facially restrict price competition among schools, limit consumer choice, 
and lower product quality.”14  Still another commentary maintains that college 
                                                 
9. Id.  Although the quotation states 1953, Bannister actually set his record on May 6, 1954. See 
Roger Bannister Breaks Four-Minutes Mile, HISTORY.COM, http://www.history.com/this-day-in-his-
tory/roger-bannister-breaks-four-minutes-mile (last visited June 9, 2016).  
10. Taylor Branch, The Shame of College Sports, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Oct. 2011, at 80, 82, 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/10/the-shame-of-college-sports/308643/. 
11. Id. at 94. 
12. Id. 
13. Marc Edelman, A Short Treatise on Amateurism and Antitrust Law: Why the NCAA’s No-Pay 
Rules Violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 64 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 61, 82  (2013) (citing Nat’l Soc’y 
of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 684, 693 (1978)). 
14. Kemper C. Powell, A Façade of Amateurism: An Examination of the NCAA Grant-in-Aid System  
Under the Sherman Act, 20 SPORTS LAW. J. 241, 242 (2013) (citing Peter Kreher, Antitrust Theory, 
College Sports, and Interleague Rulemaking: A New Critique of the NCAA’s Amateurism Rules, 6 VA. 
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sports have become so commercialized that they should be subject not only to 
the antitrust laws but to the labor and tax laws too.15 
In light of these condemnations, Professor Maureen Weston’s question, 
posed in 2013, remains apropos today: “Is amateurism dead, should it be or what 
will happen to the non-revenue sports?”16  The future of nonrevenue sports is 
beyond the scope of this Article.  The answer to the first two questions is no, 
but amateurism must change to accommodate current conditions.  The purpose 
of this Article is to present a modern amateurism model for the modern world.  
Part II will discuss the origins of the concept and its application to American 
college sports and will address both its appropriateness to a university-based 
athletic system and its shortcomings under modern social and economic  
conditions.  Part III will examine the legal case against amateurism, especially 
in relationship to antitrust law.  Part IV will assess the recent decisions of the 
trial court and the Ninth Circuit, respectively, in O’Bannon v. NCAA and the 
likely results for amateurism.17  Part V will present a modern amateurism model 
for the modern era and recommend its adoption as a preferable alternative to the 
employment model of college sports offered by its critics.     
II. A SHORT HISTORY OF AMATEURISM 
Like the societies of which it has been part, amateurism has changed  
considerably since its beginnings on the playing fields of England’s elite  
boarding schools during the Nineteenth Century.  At that time, young males who 
attended elite schools in England participated in a variety of sports  
because athletic participation was thought to be a key ingredient of a liberal 
education that trained both mind and body for leadership positions in British 
society.18  The same idea became the model for school and college-based sports 
in the United States.19   
                                                 
SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 51, 52, 86, 88 (2006)).  For other commentaries in this vein, see generally Gabe 
Feldman, A Modest Proposal for Taming the Antitrust Beast, 41 PEPP. L. REV. 249 (2014); Daniel E. 
Lazaroff, The NCAA in Its Second Century: Defender of Amateurism or Antitrust Recidivist?, 86 OR. 
L. REV. 329 (2007). 
15. See generally Amy Christian McCormick & Robert A. McCormick, The Emperor’s New 
Clothes: Lifting the NCAA’s Veil of Amateurism, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 495 (2008). 
16. Maureen Weston et al., Symposium Transcript - Amateurism and the Future of the NCAA, 3 
MISS. SPORTS L. REV. 1, 10 (2013). 
17. See generally O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955 (N.D. Cal. 2014), aff’d in part, vacated 
in part, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015). 
18. See Kay Hawes, Debate on Amateurism Has Evolved over Time, NCAA.ORG (Jan. 3, 2000), 
http://fs.ncaa.org/Docs/NCAANewsArchive/2000/association-wide/debate+on+amateurism+has 
+evolved+over+time+-+1-3-00.html. 
19. See id. 
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In England, amateurism was overtly class-conscious, indeed classist.20  It 
was based on the notion “that aristocrats engaged in leisure activities purely for 
enjoyment and to become well-rounded gentlemen.”21  Such activities  
substituted for employment because having the luxury of time to pursue leisure 
was the great privilege of being an aristocrat.22  Accordingly, the Amateur  
Rowing Association, which limited its competitions to amateurs, decreed  
 
that an amateur must never have taken money [to  
compete], . . . “nor ever taught, pursued, or assisted in the pursuit 
of athletic exercises of any kind as a means of livelihood, nor have 
ever been employed in or about boats, or in manual labour; nor be 
a mechanic, artisan or labourer.”23   
 
This “‘mechanics’ clause also [barred] those who worked with their hands from 
competing against those who did not,” apparently on the theory “that manual 
laborers had an unfair physical advantage over ‘gentlemen’” in contests of  
physical strength and endurance.24  Ironically, it “led to the exclusion of the 
Olympic sculling champion J.H.B. Kelly . . . from the 1921 Diamond Sculls 
[rowing race] at Henley” because he was a bricklayer.25  Mr. Kelly’s daughter, 
Grace, an iconic American actress, became Princess Grace of Monaco in 1956.26 
Amateurism was not confined to England, though.  Indeed, it was the  
philosophical underpinning of the Olympics for most of the Twentieth  
Century.  The Baron de Coubertin, the French aristocrat who revived the  
Olympics in 1896, shared the amateurism ideal and envisioned an international 
athletic competition conducted for the love of sport, without any financial  
rewards for the participants.27  He saw, in the athletic competitions of the  
British public schools, “a revival and modernization of ancient traditions,”  
worthy of emulation on a larger scale.28  Still, amateurism was, as Professor 
Allison notes, both classist and racist; it “was ‘classist’ in that it distinguished 
between social classes in favour of those already dominant” and “‘racist’ in that 
within the British Empire and the United States it favoured ‘white’ elites over 
                                                 
20. Id. 
21. Id. 
22. See id. 
23. ALLISON, supra note 4, at 20. 
24. Hawes, supra note 18. 
25. ALLISON, supra note 4, at 20. 
26. See id. 
27. See Hawes, supra note 18. 
28. ALLISON, supra note 4, at 36. 
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other races.”29 
Amateurism, warts and all, became the underpinning for American college 
sports in 1906, when the Intercollegiate Athletic Association, the NCAA’s  
precursor, held its first national convention.30  The participants banned the  
“recruiting ([or] ‘proselytizing’ [as they called it]) of top [high] school  
athletes” and the awarding of scholarships based on athletic ability.31  Still, the 
infant organization, which adopted its present name in 1910, had no means of 
enforcing its amateur ideal, so its stated prohibitions were voluntary, which 
meant that some institutions honored them and others did not.32   
“In 1916, the Association’s members finally agreed to insert a definition of 
amateurism into the bylaws.”33  That definition stated, “An amateur athlete is 
one who participates in competitive physical sports only for the pleasure and 
the physical, mental, moral and social benefits directly derived therefrom.”34  
Similarly, in 1929, when the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of 
Teaching published a report that was highly critical of the growing  
commercialism and professionalism in college sports,35 the definition of  
amateurism to which the NCAA and its Olympic counterpart, the Amateur  
Athletic Union, adhered stated, “An amateur sportsman is one who engages in 
sport solely for the pleasure and physical, mental, or social benefits he derives 
therefrom, and to whom sport is nothing more than an avocation.”36 
Not all NCAA member institutions practiced that philosophy though, so in 
1948, the NCAA tried to force them to do so by promulgating a Sanity Code 
designed to punish those who funneled unauthorized financial assistance to  
athletes.37  It restricted financial aid to athletes to tuition and fees and  
prohibited awards of aid “based on athletic ability” rather than financial need or 
academic merit.38  But colleges continued to find the potential for economic gain 
from athletics, especially football, too enticing to comply with the Sanity 
Code.39  Indeed, “seven colleges called the NCAA’s bluff by violating the  
                                                 
29. Id. at 71.  
30. Virginia A. Fitt, Note, The NCAA’s Lost Cause and the Legal Ease of Redefining Amateurism, 
59 DUKE L.J. 555, 560 (2009) (citing Hawes, supra note 18). 
31. Id. at 560–61. 
32. See Hawes, supra note 18. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. 
35. See generally HOWARD J. SAVAGE ET AL., AMERICAN COLLEGE ATHLETICS (1929). 
36. Snyder, supra note 5. 
37. Kyle R. Wood, Note, NCAA Student-Athlete Health Care: Antitrust Concerns Regarding the  
Insurance Coverage Certification Requirement, 10 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 561, 569–70 (2013). 
38. Id. at 570 (quoting Lazaroff, supra note 14, at 333). 
39. Id. 
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Sanity Code and gambling that their fellow members would not banish them 
from the NCAA.”40 The gamble worked; not only were the so-called Sinful 
Seven not punished, but at the 1951 NCAA Convention, opponents of the  
Sanity Code, chiefly southern and southwestern schools that had awarded  
athletic scholarships since the 1930s, “eliminated the section of the [NCAA 
C]onstitution that contained it.”41  The following year, the delegates “rewrote 
Article III, Section 4, of the NCAA Constitution to give each college the  
freedom to establish its own financial aid policies for athletes, so long as the 
college itself was the source of the aid.”42 
In 1956, a major modification of the NCAA’s amateurism philosophy  
occurred when the members voted to permit athletic scholarships—that is, “full 
grants-in-aid based on athletic participation.”43  Each grant covered “tuition, 
fees, room and board, books, and [fifteen dollars] per month for ‘laundry 
money.’”44  In future years, amateurism would undergo additional  
modifications; for example, in 1974, athletes earned the right “to compete  
as . . . professional[s] in one sport while [retaining] their [college] eligibility in 
[an]other sport[].”45  They could also “teach, coach and officiate” (although not 
for professional games) and could “tryout with a professional team,” as long as 
“they paid their own expenses and did not accept any” money for the tryout.46  
These changes showed that even though tension remained between amateurism 
and commercialism, over time they appeared to develop, according to Professor 
Allison, a degree of compatibility akin to “democracy and monarchy.”47 
Amateurism has been more enduring in American college sports than it has 
in the Olympics, though.  Avery Brundage, who was the president of the  
International Olympic Committee (IOC) from 1952 until 1972, defended  
amateurism fiercely, but after he retired, the IOC changed its rules, removing 
the term “amateur” from the Olympic charter in the 1970s and, in the 1980s, 
giving international sports federations “the power to determine age limits [for 
participants] and the eligibility of professional athletes” to compete in the 
Games.48  Under the modern Olympic model, “athletes are not paid for their 
[Olympic] participation, but rather are just not forbidden from profiting from 
                                                 
40. BRIAN L. PORTO, A NEW SEASON: USING TITLE IX TO REFORM COLLEGE SPORTS 36 (2003). 
41. Id. at 37.   
42. Id. 
43. Wood, supra note 37, at 570. 
44. Id. (citing Lazaroff, supra note 14, at 334 n.24).  
45. Hawes, supra note 18. 
46. Id. 
47. ALLISON, supra note 4, at 70. 
48. Hawes, supra note 18. 
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the attention their participation brings them.”49 
Still, in the past generation, as college sports, especially football and men’s 
basketball, have become increasingly commercialized, even a casual observer 
could see the tension between the amateurism that supposedly justifies the 
games and the commercialism that characterizes them.  On the one hand, the 
philosophy of amateurism is nicely encapsulated in the following elements, as 
conceived by sports sociologist D. Stanley Eitzen: 
 
1. The amateur derives pleasure from the contest. 
2. The activity is freely chosen. 
3. The process is every bit as important as the outcome. 
4. The motivation to participate comes from the intrinsic  
rewards from the activity rather than the extrinsic rewards of 
money and fame.50 
 
Those conditions remain in effect for lacrosse players at Middlebury, rowers at 
Amherst, and cross-country runners at Gettysburg and Ohio Wesleyan. 
But those are not the schools or the sports featured on television  
throughout the academic year; the featured schools belong instead to the  
Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS) and to basketball’s NCAA Division I and, 
within those groups, to a still more exclusive club known as the Power Five 
conferences.51  In their world, commerce is king, as is evident in the mission 
statement featured in the 2014 handbook of the Big 12 Conference, one  
purpose of which is to “optimize revenues.”52  The Big 12 is not alone in that 
aim, as collegiate sport has become a $12 billion industry, “making [it] more 
profitable than any professional sports league.”53   
In this environment, much is expected of the players whose exploits make 
that profitability possible; accordingly, coaches try to maximize players’ 
productivity by controlling their time and requiring that much of it be spent on 
                                                 
49. Alex Moyer, Note, Throwing Out the Playbook: Replacing the NCAA’s Anticompetitive  
Amateurism Regime with the Olympic Model, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 761, 817 (2015) (citing Patrick 
Hruby, The Olympics Show Why College Sports Should Give Up on Amateurism, ATLANTIC (July 25, 
2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2012/07/the-olympics-show-why-college-
sports-should-give-up-on-amateurism/260275/).   
50. ALLISON, supra note 4, at 21–22. 
51. The Power Five conferences include the Atlantic Coast Conference (ACC), the Big Ten  
Conference, the Big 12 Conference, the Southeastern Conference (SEC), and the Pac-12 Conference. 
52. Snyder, supra note 5 (emphasis omitted). 
53. Moyer, supra note 49, at 765 (citing James Monks, Revenue Shares and Monopsonistic  
Behavior in Intercollegiate Athletics 1 (Cornell Higher Educ. Research Inst., Working Paper No. 155, 
2013), https://www.ilr.cornell.edu/sites/ilr.cornell.edu/files/WP155.pdf). 
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their sport.  For example, a recent National Labor Relations Board case  
involving an attempt by Northwestern University football players to form a  
labor union revealed that they spent between forty and fifty hours per week on 
football during the regular season.54  Between January 1st and the start of  
preseason practice in August, the players enjoy only nine “discretionary” weeks, 
when they are not required to be on campus and practicing or working out.55   
Some evidence suggests that excessive time demands on college athletes 
exist in sports other than football and men’s basketball.  A study of athletes in 
all sports, both men and women, at nine of the Pac-12 schools revealed that they 
are, in a word, “stressed.”56  The athletes “report[ed] spending an average of 
[twenty-one] hours per week on required athletic activities” during the season, 
but “an additional [twenty-nine] hours on other [sport-related] activities,  
including [participating in] voluntary” (but often expected) training, “receiving 
[medical] treatment . . . and traveling for competitions.”57  The bulk of the  
additional hours are spent on “traveling for competitions,” which the athletes 
characterize as “extremely stressful” because “it forces [them] to miss class[es]” 
and it consumes time that could otherwise be spent studying or sleeping.58   
Apparently, even if the revenues associated with football and basketball have 
not trickled down to other sports, the high expectations that football and  
basketball players have long faced have indeed migrated to other sports, too. 
In any event, football and men’s basketball players are increasingly seen as 
short-term indentured servants or, at least, as woefully underpaid workers in a 
multibillion-dollar industry.  As early as 2000, an author writing in an NCAA 
publication appeared to recognize this development, writing that “the debate 
over amateurism may have changed in recent years from an attempt [to] define 
athletics purity to questioning the degree to which athletes should receive [their] 
fair share.”59  More recently, the questioning has become a demand that athletes 
receive their fair share, whether by redefining amateurism (again) to permit  
                                                 
54. Nw. Univ. & Coll. Athletes Players Ass’n, Case 13-RC-121359, 2014 WL 1246914, at *6 
(N.L.R.B. Mar. 26, 2014).  In this decision, the regional director of the NLRB’s Chicago office  
concluded that the football players were university employees and directed that an election be held to 
determine if the players wished to form a union.  Id. at *21.  However, their union bid ended when the 
full NLRB, on appeal by Northwestern, declined to assert jurisdiction over a labor dispute involving 
college athletes.  See Nw. Univ. & Coll. Athletes Players’ Ass’n, 362 N.L.R.B. 167, at *6 (2015).  
55. See Nw. Univ., 2014 WL 1246914, at *7 n.20.  




58. Id.  
59. Hawes, supra note 18. 
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payments to athletes beyond their traditional athletic scholarships60 or by  
making them university employees and paying them salaries for their athletic 
work.61  This demand, which has been front and center in the O’Bannon lawsuit 
alluded to earlier, prompted another change to the amateurism model when, in 
late 2014, the Power Five conferences voted to increase the value of athletic 
scholarships to cover the full cost of college attendance, including travel and 
incidental expenses.62  At the University of Alabama, for example, athletes  
receive stipends of $5,386 per year for nonresidents and $4,172 per year for 
Alabama residents.63   
Part III will discuss the legal underpinnings of the demand for increased 
compensation for athletes.  It will also discuss the alternative forms such  
compensation could take. 
III. THE CASE AGAINST AMATEURISM 
The case against amateurism must be understood in light of the  
commercial environment in which FBS football and Division I basketball  
operate today.  To its critics, amateurism is a cruel anachronism for college  
athletes considering that “[i]n 2010, the NCAA [signed] a fourteen-year, $10.8 
billion contract with CBS and Turner Sports for the exclusive right[s to  
televise its lucrative] NCAA Men’s Basketball Championship Tournament.”64  
Amateurism seems equally out of step with the $7.3 billion contract the FBS 
schools signed with ESPN to broadcast the College Football Playoff, which  
began in 2014.65  In 2013, the Big Ten Conference alone, thanks to “the Big Ten 
Network and its other television contracts averaging $248.2 million annually . . 
. distributed more than $26 million to each member school . . . [an amount] that 
. . . is expected to rise to $35 million per school for the 2016-2017 season.”66  In 
                                                 
60. See Fitt, supra note 30, at 580–87. 
61. See generally McCormick & McCormick, supra note 15. 
62. Jake New, Colleges Inflate Full Cost of Attendance Numbers, Increasing Stipends for Athletes, 
INSIDE HIGHER ED (Aug. 12, 2015), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/08/12/colleges-in-
flate-full-cost-attendance-numbers-increasing-stipends-athletes. 
63. Id. 
64. Moyer, supra note 49, at 769 (citing Richard T. Karcher, Broadcast Rights, Unjust Enrichment, 
and the Student-Athlete, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 107, 109 n.1 (2012)). 
65. Id. (citing James Andrew Miller et al., College Football’s Most Dominant Player? It’s ESPN, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2013) http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/25/sports/ncaafootball/college-foot-
balls-most-dominant-player-its-espn.html). 
66. Id. (citing Kristi Dosh, A Comparison: Conference Television Deals, ESPN (Mar. 19, 2013), 
http://espn.go.com/blog/playbook/dollars/post/_/id/3163/a-comparison-conference-television-deals; 
Chris Smith, How Massive Conference Payouts Are Changing the Face of College Sports, FORBES 
(Dec. 26, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/chrissmith/2013/12/26/how-massive-conference-pay-
outs-are-changing-the-face-of-college-sports/). 
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2014, “seventy-two head [football] coaches earned [more than $1] million” in 
salary, and nearly thirty of them earned more than $3 million.67  Nobody  
benefits more from the college sports juggernaut, though, than the television 
networks.  The late William Friday, former chancellor of the University of North 
Carolina System, told Taylor Branch 
 
“We do every little thing for them . . . . We furnish the theater, 
the actors, the lights, the music, and the audience for a drama 
measured neatly in time slots.  They bring the camera and turn 
it on.” . . . If television wants to broadcast football from here on 
a Thursday night . . . “we shut down the university at 3 o’clock 
to accommodate the crowds.”68   
 
Despite such unabashed commercialism all around them, the players remain 
bound by the NCAA’s code of amateurism.  “The NCAA’s direct regulation of 
amateurism [occupies] two . . . categories: the prevention of [compensation] 
and the creation of a barrier between amateur and professional athletics.”69   
Regulations in the first category prevent college athletes from using their  
athletic ability “‘directly or indirectly’ for pay in any form”; that is, they  
cannot use their “name[s], reputation[s], or athletic popularity for [financial] 
gain.”70  Regulations in the second category “prohibit[ athletes from] . . . signing 
a contract or [making] any commitment . . . to play professional[ly]” and from 
reaching an “agreement with an agent for representation and promotion,” even 
if the agreement does not take effect until after the completion of collegiate  
eligibility.71  This category of regulations bars the hiring of an agent who  
contacts professional teams on the athlete’s behalf, “the presence of [an] agent 
during negotiations” between the athlete and a pro team, and the receipt by  
college athletes of benefits provided by agents.72 
Both types of regulation seem less aimed at preserving an honorable  
tradition or protecting athletes from commercial exploitation than at  
maintaining a low-cost workforce in a high-dollar industry so as to maximize 
earnings.  Indeed, the regulations often appear not only unduly punitive, but 
                                                 
67. Id. at 770–71 (citing Steve Berkowitz et al., 2015 NCAAF Coaches Salaries, USA TODAY, 
http://sports.usatoday.com/ncaa/salaries (last visited June 9, 2016)). 
68. Branch, supra note 10. 
69. Fitt, supra note 30, at 564. 
70. Id. at 564–65 (citing 2008-09 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL arts. 12.1.2(a), (d), 12.4–5 (2008)  
[hereinafter 2008-09 NCAA MANUAL]).  
71. Id. at 565 (citing 2008-09 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 70, arts. 12.1.2(g), 12.3). 
72. Id. at 566 (citing 2008-09 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 70, art. 12.3). 
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petty, nonsensical, and even likely to expose athletes to exploitation instead of 
protecting them from it.  For example, in 2012, Jonathan Benjamin, a walk-on 
basketball player at the University of Richmond, unwittingly violated NCAA 
Bylaw 12.4.4, which allows an athlete to establish a business while in school, 
so long as “the student-athlete’s name, photograph, appearance or athletics  
reputation are not used to promote the business.”73  Benjamin designed a line of 
athletic clothing called “Official Visit” and posted pictures of himself wearing 
his creations on his company’s Facebook and Twitter pages.74  Ironically,  
neither the University of Richmond nor the Atlantic 10 Conference discovered 
the violation until Benjamin asked Richmond’s athletic compliance officer 
about it because the company that produced his T-shirts wanted to feature him 
in its newsletter.75  When it was discovered, Richmond had no choice but to 
declare him ineligible to play basketball merely because he modeled his own 
creations instead of hiring a non-athlete classmate to do so.76 
Had Jonathan Benjamin been a sculptor or a classical guitarist, he could 
have modeled as many T-shirts as he wished, but because he was an athlete, his 
entrepreneurialism was limited to designing and producing T-shirts and could 
not extend to modeling them.  Had Jonathan Benjamin been a professional actor, 
as Natalie Portman was when she filmed Star Wars Episode II: Attack of the 
Clones while a student at Harvard, his clothing line would likely have been the 
subject of gushy feature stories, not an NCAA rules violation.77 
If NCAA rules against using one’s athletic visibility to earn income seem 
silly and antiquated, NCAA rules designed to keep college and professional 
sports separate from one another sometimes expose athletes to exploitation  
instead of protecting them from it.  For example, the NCAA’s prohibition on a 
college player (or a high school player whom colleges are recruiting) hiring an 
agent to assess the player’s marketability in a professional draft adversely  
affects baseball players, whose annual draft occurs before the high school and 
college seasons conclude.78  The high school player wants to know what his 
professional prospects are before deciding whether to turn pro or commit to a 
college.  Similarly, the college player wants to know what his professional  
prospects are before deciding whether to sign with a pro team or return to  
college.  In both instances, the best person to obtain that information for the 
                                                 
73. Patrick Hruby, The Worst Fit, SPORTS ON EARTH (Aug. 21, 2013), 
http://www.sportsonearth.com/article/57680744/how-the-ncaas-amateurism-policy-negatively-af-
fected-former-richmond-basketball-player-jonathan-benjamin (emphasis omitted). 
74. Id. 
75. Id. 
76. See id. 
77. Id. 
78. Fitt, supra note 30, at 571–72. 
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player is an agent, but hiring an agent to negotiate with a pro team will cause 
the athlete to lose his collegiate eligibility.  As a result, the player faces an  
unhappy choice between (1) following the no-agent rule and participating in 
what will likely be a bargaining mismatch between the team and the player (and 
his parents) or (2) reaching a secret agreement with an agent for negotiations 
with professional teams.79  In other words, with an agent, the player risks  
collegiate ineligibility, but without an agent, he risks commercial exploitation. 
Beyond their flaws, note the critics, the NCAA’s amateurism rules are  
unnecessary to preserve the uniqueness, hence the popularity, of college sports.  
According to one critic, 
 
[w]hen Arizona faces Stanford, no one cares if the one team’s 
scholarships are worth more, or if the other squad’s star  
quarterback is getting a cash handshake from an overzealous 
booster.  Eliminate amateurism tomorrow, and big-time college 
football and basketball fans won’t desert en masse; if anything, 
they might like NCAA sports more, given that hypocrisy and 
corruption will no longer be core components of the exercise.80    
 
Another critic contends that the amateurism rules are not key to the  
continued popularity of college sports because the factors that distinguish  
college sports from their professional counterparts are “loyalty to one’s alma 
mater, instate and conference rivalries, and school spirit,” not amateurism.81  
The critic adds that because “teams are associated with universities . . . there is 
a built-in demand from students, alumni, and local fans for an athletic team to 
represent their university and community.”82  Besides, still another critic  
observes, the NCAA’s claim that its amateurism rules must remain in place if 
college sports are to retain their popularity does not withstand scrutiny under 
the current commercial conditions.83  “At this point,” the critic notes, “there is 
no question that the NCAA’s focus on the student-athlete is harder to stomach 
than it was thirty years ago, at least with respect to the top one percent of men’s 
                                                 
79. See id. at 571.   For a more complete discussion of the NCAA’s no-agent rule and its  
consequences for baseball players, see Brian L. Porto, What Recruiters Don’t Tell Athletes and Athletes 
Don’t Think to Ask: A Critique of the NCAA’s Nonacademic Eligibility Rules, 13 VA. SPORTS & ENT. 
L.J. 240, 259–67 (2014). 
80. Hruby, supra note 49. 
81. Moyer, supra note 49, at 814 (quoting Chad W. Pekron, The Professional Student-Athlete:  
Undermining Amateurism as an Antitrust Defense in NCAA Compensation Challenges, 24 HAMLINE 
L. REV. 24, 55 (2000)). 
82. Id. at 814–15 (citing Hruby, supra note 49). 
83. Feldman, supra note 14, at 254–55. 
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football and basketball.”84  And, the critic adds, “there is no empirical evidence 
to support the conclusion that college football cannot exist without  
‘amateurism’ restrictions on its players.”85   
Perhaps the most insightful critique of the amateurism rules, though, was 
the one that Professor Daniel Lazaroff offered several years ago.  He observed, 
“[I]f the NCAA really wishes to maintain a clear line of demarcation between 
amateur and professional sports, it should realize that such a distinction  
probably rests less on the question of compensation and more on emphasizing 
the ‘student’ part of student-athlete.”86   
But the criticisms of the NCAA’s amateurism rules are not confined to  
policy assessments; they also include legal evaluations, such as one  
commentator’s contention that the prohibition on paying athletes “is illegal  
because it prevents [NCAA] members from engaging in competitive ‘bidding’ 
to recruit student-athletes.”87  The commentator adds that “the NCAA’s  
principle of amateurism likely violates [S]ection 1 of the Sherman Act by  
artificially prohibiting student-athlete pay and by eliminating from the college 
sports marketplace those colleges that wish to recruit top student-athletes.”88  
Similarly, another commentator charges that the amateurism rules “violate the 
federal antitrust laws because they facially restrict price competition among 
schools, limit consumer choice, and lower product quality.”89  They constitute 
“price-fixing,” the commentator contends, by “restrict[ing] the amount of 
money, in the form of scholarships, that schools are permitted to provide their 
[athletes].”90 
Besides criticizing the NCAA’s rules, antitrust experts have taken aim at 
the courts’ treatment of those rules, specifically, courts’ tendency to divide them 
into two overarching categories: “(1) rules designed to promote and  
preserve the eligibility and amateur status of student-athletes; and (2) other 
forms of regulation with a more economic purpose.”91  According to Professor 
Lazaroff, “[c]ourts tend to routinely validate” the former, while subjecting the 
                                                 
84. Id. at 255. 
85. Id. 
86. Lazaroff, supra note 14, at 368. 
87. Edelman, supra note 13. 
88. Id. at 98. 
89. Powell, supra note 14.  
90. Id. at 245. 
91. Lazaroff, supra note 14, at 329, 329 n.1 (citing Justice v. NCAA, 577 F. Supp. 356, 383 (D. 
Ariz. 1983) (stating “the NCAA engages in ‘two distinct kinds of rulemaking activity’--one rooted in 
concern for amateurism and the other ‘increasingly accompanied by a discernible economic  
purpose.’”)). 
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latter to “closer judicial scrutiny.”92  The origins of this dichotomy in favor of 
amateurism lie in dicta from the Supreme Court’s majority opinion in NCAA v. 
Board of Regents,93 in which the Court invalidated the NCAA’s longstanding 
Football Television Plan on antitrust grounds.94 
Two quotations in particular from Justice Stevens’s majority opinion  
provide the justification, according to antitrust scholars, for courts’ traditional 
favoritism toward the NCAA’s amateurism rules.  The respective quotations are 
as follows: 
 
The NCAA plays a critical role in the maintenance of a revered 
tradition of amateurism in college sports.  There can be no  
question but that it needs ample latitude to play that role, or that 
the preservation of the student-athlete in higher education adds 
richness and diversity to intercollegiate athletics and is entirely 
consistent with the goals of the Sherman Act.95    
[T]he NCAA seeks to market a particular brand of football—
college football.  The identification of this “product” with an 
academic tradition differentiates college football from and 
makes it more popular than professional sports to which it 
might otherwise be comparable, such as, for example, minor 
league baseball.  In order to preserve the character and quality 
of the “product,” athletes must not be paid, must be required to 
attend class, and the like.96  
  
Because of the language quoted above, Board of Regents provided a  
doctrinal foundation for a “two-pronged antitrust approach to NCAA  
regulation.”97  The majority opinion suggested that joint economic action by 
member institutions that did not address the regulation of players (e.g., the  
Football Television Plan) “should be subjected to rule of reason analysis under 
[S]ection 1 of the Sherman Act” to determine if the challenged action was an 
unreasonable restraint of trade.98  But that opinion also suggested “that the  
antitrust laws should not invalidate restraints on competition for the services of 
                                                 
92. Id. at 329–30. 
93. See generally 468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
94. See id. at 120; Feldman, supra note 14, at 251. 
95. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 120. 
96. Id. at 101–02. 
97. Lazaroff, supra note 14, at 340. 
98. Id. 
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NCAA student-athletes.”99  Since Board of Regents, then, courts have typically 
followed traditional antitrust methodology when addressing antitrust claims in 
college sports unrelated to the athletes.100  Employing the Rule of Reason test, 
they inquire whether (1) the challenged action had anticompetitive effects on 
interstate commerce and, if so, whether (2) the defendant could show  
pro-competitive effects that outweigh the anticompetitive effects, and (3) 
whether the plaintiff could demonstrate that less restrictive means could achieve 
those precompetitive effects.101 
In Agnew v. NCAA,102 however, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit abandoned the traditional judicial distinction between  
commercial and non-commercial (e.g., amateurism-related) rules, holding  
instead that the Sherman Act generally applies to NCAA rules.103  According to 
the Agnew court, “[n]o knowledgeable observer could earnestly assert that  
big-time college football programs competing for highly sought-after high 
school football players do not anticipate economic gain from a successful  
recruiting program.”104  Despite this reasoning, the court failed to overturn 
NCAA-imposed limits on the number of athletic scholarships colleges can 
award per team, because the court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to  
identify a relevant market in which the challenged restraint occurred.105  The 
Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the suit.106  Agnew may 
have signaled a sea change in judicial responses to the NCAA’s amateurism 
rules, though, because the O’Bannon decision, which will be the focus of Part 
IV, also assumed that the Sherman Act applies to NCAA rules regulating  
athletes. 
For now, however, the spotlight should pivot from criticisms of NCAA 
rules to proposals for changing them.  Several authors recommend replacing the 
current no pay amateur model with an Olympic model, under which colleges 
would not pay athletes directly, but athletes could obtain endorsement deals and 
be paid for signing autographs.107 Another supporter of the Olympic model  
argues that college athletes “should be able to access the free market and  
capitalize on [their] popularity, such as by endorsing products or being paid for 
                                                 
99. Id. at 339. 
100. Id. at 340. 
101. See id. at 357. 
102. 683 F.3d 328 (7th Cir. 2012). 
103. Id. at 341; Feldman, supra note 14, at 260–61. 
104. Agnew, 683 F.3d at 340. 
105. Feldman, supra note 14, at 261. 
106. Agnew, 683 F.3d at 348. 
107. See, e.g., Powell, supra note 14, at 258. 
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appearances, autographs, and memorabilia.”108  But the Olympic model’s  
supporters disagree about whether revenue from the colleges’ use of their  
players’ names, images, and likenesses should be put in a trust fund for players 
to receive when their athletic eligibility ends or given to them as they earn it, 
the amounts of money to be paid, and whether those amounts can vary according 
to a player’s value to the team.109  
Other commentators advocate more of an employment relationship  
between athletes and their institutions.  One points out that “in June 2011,  
seven Southeastern Conference [head] football coaches proposed designating a 
share of their . . . salaries to establish stipends of $300 per game for their  
[players].”110  The plan was never implemented, though, because athletic  
administrators opposed it for fear of incurring the NCAA’s wrath.111   
According to this commentator, “[I]f the seven Southeastern Conference  
colleges had not quashed their coaches’ stipend plan, those colleges would have 
been able to use the stipends to recruit better players—producing a stronger  
on-field football product and thus leading to greater fan satisfaction.”112   
Two other commentators argue jointly for an even more explicitly  
employment-based relationship between athletes and their institutions.  In their 
view, “[b]ecause the athlete-university relationship is primarily commercial, not 
academic, the athletes should be considered employees under [the National  
Labor Relations Board’s decision in] Brown University,113 not amateurs or  
‘student-athletes’ as the NCAA incessantly asserts.”114  Moreover, because of 
what they call “[t]he overwhelmingly commercial nature of major college  
athletics,” these commentators maintain that college sports should be subject 
not only to antitrust law, but to labor and tax law, too.115 
Thus, the prescriptions for changing the NCAA’s amateurism rules range 
from replacing them with an Olympic model that would improve athletes’  
financial circumstances without making them university employees to  
unabashedly designating them as employees and, presumably, paying them 
                                                 
108. Moyer, supra note 49, at 827 (citing RAMOGI HUMA & ELLEN J. STAUROWSKY, NAT’L COLL. 
PLAYERS ASS’N, THE PRICE OF POVERTY IN BIG TIME COLLEGE SPORT 5 (2011), http://as-
sets.usw.org/ncpa/The-Price-of-Poverty-in-Big-Time-College-Sport.pdf). 
109. Compare id. at 826 (arguing college athletes should receive “immediate stipend[s]”), with 
Powell, supra note 14, at 258 (arguing colleges should create trusts for college athletes for after  
graduation). 
110. Edelman, supra note 13, at 69. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. 
113. See 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 490–91 (2004) (holding that graduate assistants are not employees  
because their relationship to their university is primarily academic).  
114. McCormick & McCormick, supra note 15, at 500. 
115. See id. 
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salaries.  Ultimately, this Article will stake out its own position in the  
amateurism debate.  Before doing so, however, it will review the most recent 
judicial attempt to address the amateurism conundrum: O’Bannon v. NCAA. 
IV. AMATEURISM ON TRIAL: O’BANNON V. NCAA  
A. The Trial Court’s Decision 
In O’Bannon, the district court followed the path charted by the Seventh 
Circuit in Agnew; that is, it abandoned the tradition of treating all NCAA rules 
directed at athletes as non-commercial, hence beyond the reach of the antitrust 
laws.  Like the Agnew court, the district court in O’Bannon applied Rule of 
Reason analysis to the claims of the plaintiffs, including former University of 
California, Los Angeles basketball star Ed O’Bannon, that the NCAA’s  
prohibition on athletes profiting from the use of their names, images, and  
likenesses in television broadcasts, videogames, and other media violated the 
Sherman Act.116  Under Rule of Reason analysis, the court explained, a  
plaintiff must show that the challenged “restraint produces ‘significant  
anticompetitive effects’ within a ‘relevant market.’”117  If the plaintiff makes 
that showing, the defendant must present “evidence of the restraint’s  
procompetitive effects.”118  If the defendant clears that hurdle, the plaintiff, to 
prevail, “must ‘show that “any legitimate objective[ the restraint might serve] 
can be achieved [by] . . . less restrictive”’” means.119 
In opting for Rule of Reason analysis, the O’Bannon court explicitly  
rejected the notion that the NCAA’s amateurism rules do not implicate  
antitrust concerns.120  It observed that “the Supreme Court’s incidental phrase 
in Board of Regents does not establish that the NCAA’s current restraints on 
compensation are procompetitive and without less restrictive alternatives.”121  
That is because the college sports industry has become considerably more  
commercial than it was in 1984 when Board of Regents was decided and  
because Board of Regents, after all, was not about athlete compensation.122 
Thus distinguishing Board of Regents, the district court proceeded to  
fact-finding and found that “absent the challenged NCAA rules, teams of FBS 
                                                 
116. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 963, 985 (N.D. Cal. 2014), aff’d in part, vacated in 
part, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015). 
117. Id. at 985 (quoting Tanaka v. Univ. of S. Cal., 252 F.3d 1059, 1063 (9th Cir. 2001)). 
118. Id. (quoting Tanaka, 252 F.3d at 1063).  
119. Id. (quoting Tanaka, 252 F.3d at 1063). 
120. Id. at 999–1000. 
121. Id. at 1000. 
122. See id. 
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football and Division I basketball players would be able to create and sell group 
licenses for the use of their names, images, and likenesses in live game  
telecasts.”123  In other words, “the NCAA has the power—and exercises that 
power—to fix prices and restrain competition in the college education market 
that Plaintiffs have identified.”124  As a result, the court continued, athletes are 
forced to bear a greater portion of the cost of attendance than they would if 
NCAA rules permitted compensating the athletes.125  “In the absence of this 
restraint,” the court observed, “schools would compete against one another by 
offering to pay more for the best recruits’ athletic services and licensing rights 
—that is, they would engage in price competition.”126   
For its part, “[t]he NCAA [argued] that the challenged restr[aint]s . . . are 
reasonable because they are necessary to preserve . . . amateurism, maintain 
competitive balance among . . . teams, promote the integration of academics and 
athletics, and increase the total output of its product,” college sports.127  But 
“[t]he [c]ourt f[ound] that the NCAA’s current restrictions on  
student-athlete compensation, which cap athletics-based financial aid below the 
cost of attendance,” were not necessary to preserve “amateurism” as the NCAA 
defined it.128  The court also found that the evidence the plaintiffs presented at 
trial (e.g., loyal fan bases, regional loyalties, school ties, etc.) showed that the 
NCAA’s restrictions on athlete compensation did not, as the NCAA contended, 
fuel consumer interest in FBS football and Division I basketball.129   
Accordingly, said the court, consumer preferences “do not justify the rigid  
restrictions [on athlete compensation] challenged in this case.”130 
The court went on to find that the NCAA’s restrictions on paying athletes 
did not promote “competitive balance” between teams, as the NCAA  
maintained, because the NCAA had not endeavored to restrict institutional 
                                                 
123. Id. at 969. 
124. Id. at 973. 
125. Id. at 989. 
126. Id. at 991–92. 
127. Id. at 973. 
128. Id. at 975.  In the 2015-16 NCAA Manual, the “Principle of Amateurism” is explained as 
follows:  
Student-athletes shall be amateurs in an intercollegiate sport, and their participation should 
be motivated primarily by education and by the physical, mental and social benefits to be 
derived.  Student participation in intercollegiate athletics is an avocation, and  
student-athletes should be protected from exploitation by professional and commercial  
enterprises.   
2015-16 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL art. 2.9 (2015), http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdown-
loads/D116OCT.pdf. 
129. O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 975–78. 
130. Id. at 978.  
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spending on athletic facilities, coaches’ salaries, and recruiting, all of which  
affected competitive balance.131  Still, the court did not reject the NCAA’s  
“procompetitive justifications” entirely, “find[ing] that certain limited  
restrictions on student-athlete compensation may help to integrate  
student-athletes into the academic communities of their schools, which may in 
turn improve the schools’ college education product.”132  But the court did  
reject the fourth and final of those justifications that “[t]he NCAA’s  
challenged restrictions on compensation . . . increase the number of  
opportunities for” athletes and their institutions to compete in college sports.133  
In this regard, the court found that, based on the testimony at trial, institutions 
would not leave the FBS or Division I basketball if the prohibition on paying 
athletes were lifted.134 
Proceeding to its conclusions of law, the district court determined, in  
accordance with its factual findings, that although the NCAA’s goal of  
preserving amateurism might justify prohibiting “large payments to  
student-athletes” to maintain fan support for college sports, that goal “d[id] not 
justify the rigid prohibition on” all payments beyond an athletic scholarship.135  
The court reiterated its earlier rejection of the NCAA’s claims that the  
pro-competitive goals of maintaining competitive balance136 and increasing the 
“total output” of college games justified the no-pay rule.137  Finally,  
addressing the NCAA’s stated goal of integrating academics and athletics, the 
court acknowledged that “by preventing student-athletes from being cut off 
from the broader campus community[, l]imited restrictions on student-athlete 
compensation may help [institutions] achieve [the] narrow procompetitive 
goal.”138  However, achieving that goal, the court admonished, cannot justify 
the NCAA’s “sweeping prohibition on any student-athlete compensation, paid 
now or in the future, from licensing revenue generated from the use of  
student-athletes’ names, images, and likenesses.”139 
Thus, in the context of Rule of Reason analysis, the plaintiffs established 
the existence of anticompetitive restraints, but the NCAA showed that the  
restraints served two procompetitive goals, namely, preserving consumer  
interest in college sports and ensuring the integration of academics and  
                                                 
131. See id. at 978–79. 
132. Id. at 980. 
133. Id. at 982. 
134. Id. 
135. Id. at 1001. 
136. Id. at 1001–02. 
137. Id. at 1003–04. 
138. Id. at 1003. 
139. Id.  
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athletics at NCAA institutions.140  The final step in this dance between  
amateurism and antitrust law was for the plaintiffs to show that less restrictive 
means to the NCAA’s two procompetitive goals were available.141 
The district court quickly concluded that two of the three less restrictive 
means the plaintiffs suggested were appropriate.142  For example,  
 
the NCAA could permit [its members] to award stipends to  
student-athletes up to the full cost of [college]  
attendance . . . . [T]he NCAA could [also] permit its [members] 
to hold in trust limited and equal shares of its licensing revenue 
to be distributed to its student-athletes after they leave college 
or their [collegiate] eligibility [ends].143   
 
But the NCAA members could not allow athletes to receive income from  
endorsing products or signing autographs, because such arrangements would 
undermine the NCAA’s efforts to protect athletes from “commercial  
exploitation.”144 
Based on these findings and conclusions, the court held that the challenged 
“NCAA[] rules unreasonably restrain trade” in the market in which institutions 
“compete to acquire [their] recruits’ athletic services and licensing rights,” 
thereby violating § 1 of the Sherman Act.145  Therefore, “the Court . . .  
enjoin[ed] the NCAA from enforcing any rules . . . that would prohibit its  
member schools . . . from [providing] their . . . [athletes] a limited share of the 
revenues generated from the use of their names, images, and likenesses.”146  The 
injunction prevented the NCAA from capping the athletes’ individual shares of 
                                                 
140. Id. at 1004. 
141. Id. 
142. Id. at 1005. 
143. Id. 
144. Id. at 984. 
145. Id. at 1007.  Although the court agreed with the plaintiffs that NCAA rules were  
anticompetitive in the market for college athletes, it disagreed that those rules were also anticompetitive 
in the group-licensing market.  Id. at 995.  The court observed, “Plaintiffs have not presented any  
evidence to show that, in the absence of the challenged restraint, teams of student-athletes would  
actually compete against one another to sell their group licenses.”  Id.  Instead, television networks 
would acquire only the group licenses of the teams to be featured in particular telecasts.  Id.  Neither 
did the plaintiffs show how buyers of group licenses might compete against each other.  Id. at 996.  
According to the court, “[a]llowing student-athletes to seek compensation for group licenses would not 
increase the number of television networks in the market or otherwise enhance competition among 
them.”  Id.  Thus, the district court found an antitrust injury in only one of the two markets identified 
by the plaintiffs.  Id. at 996–97.  
146. Id. at 1007–08. 
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those revenues at less than $5,000 per year, which amount the court justified as 
comparable to Pell Grants, for which some athletes were also eligible, depend-
ing on their financial need.147 
B. The Appellate Court’s Decision 
The NCAA appealed the district court’s decision to the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.148  The question before the appellate court was 
“whether the NCAA’s rules are subject to the antitrust laws and, if so, whether 
they are an unlawful restraint of trade.”149  The majority opinion signaled its 
conclusion early on by noting “that the district court’s decision was largely  
correct.”150  Like the district court, the appellate court held that the NCAA’s 
amateurism “rules are not exempt from antitrust scrutiny; rather, they must be 
analyzed under the Rule of Reason.”151  Also like the district court, the appellate 
court concluded that an appropriate alternative to the prohibition on athlete  
compensation would be for the NCAA to allow member institutions to award 
athletes scholarships that covered the full cost of attendance, which would  
increase the value of an athletic scholarship by several thousand dollars per 
year.152  But unlike the district court, the appellate court rejected the notion of 
allowing athletes to be paid cash compensation of up to $5,000 per year, thereby 
affirming the district court’s opinion in part and reversing it in part.153 
The majority opinion began by considering the NCAA’s claim that, under 
Board of Regents, all “NCAA[] amateurism rules are ‘valid as a matter of 
law.’”154  “[T]he NCAA contends,” said the court, “that any Section 1 challenge 
to its amateurism rules must fail as a matter of law because the Board of Regents 
Court held that those rules are presumptively valid.”155  The appellate court  
disagreed, reasoning that in Board of Regents, the Supreme Court had not  
discussed the amateurism rules on their merits, but instead, “to explain why 
NCAA rules should be analyzed under the Rule of Reason, rather than held to 
be illegal per se.”156  Therefore, instead of approving the “amateurism rules as 
                                                 
147. Id. at 1008. 
148. See generally O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015). 
149. Id. at 1052. 
150. Id. at 1053. 
151. Id. 
152. See id. 
153. Id. 
154. Id. at 1061 (referencing NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984)). 
155. Id. at 1063. 
156. Id. 
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categorically consistent with the Sherman Act,”157 Board of Regents “held that, 
because many NCAA rules[, including] the amateurism rules[,] are part of the 
‘character and quality of the [NCAA’s] “product,”’ no NCAA rule should be 
invalidated without a Rule of Reason analysis.”158  In short, the appellate court 
concluded, “[t]he [Supreme] Court’s long encomium to amateurism, though  
impressive-sounding, was [merely] dicta.”159 
Neither did “[t]he NCAA’s argument that its compensation rules are 
‘eligibility’ restrictions” that do not regulate any commercial activity impress 
the appellate judges, who dismissed the NCAA’s contention as “a sleight of 
hand” because “[t]here is real money at issue here.”160  Put another way, the 
rules prohibiting athlete compensation were more like rules affecting the 
NCAA’s relationships “with . . . coaches or . . . corporate business partners” 
than rules concerning academic eligibility to compete.161 
The majority proceeded to conclude that the plaintiffs showed they suffered 
an antitrust injury because the NCAA’s rules prevented them from profiting 
from the use of their names, images, and likenesses in the videogame indus-
try.162  The videogame example was sufficient to demonstrate the plaintiffs’  
injury, so the court did not need to consider whether that injury extended to live 
television broadcasts or archival footage of college games.163  The athletes must 
forego compensation for the use of their names, images, and likenesses (NILs) 
and accept an athletic scholarship, but nothing more, “because the NCAA 
[member institutions] have agreed to value the athletes’ NILs at zero, ‘an  
anticompetitive effect’” in the court’s eyes.164  That anticompetitive effect was 
price-fixing, so under the Rule of Reason, the plaintiffs demonstrated an  
antitrust injury.165 
The baton was now in the hand of the NCAA, which needed to show  
procompetitive goals that justified its prohibition on athlete compensation.166  
The NCAA succeeded in that the appellate court agreed with the district court’s 
finding of a “procompetitive effect in the NCAA’s commitment to  
amateurism[,] namely, that the amateur nature of collegiate sports increases 
                                                 
157. Id. 
158. Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 102). 
159. Id. 
160. Id. at 1065. 
161. Id. at 1066. 
162. Id. at 1067. 
163. Id. 
164. Id. at 1071 (quoting O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 973 (N.D. Cal. 2014), aff’d in 
part, vacated in part, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015)). 
165. Id. at 1071–72. 
166. See id. at 1072. 
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their appeal to consumers.”167  Therefore, the appellate court determined “that 
the NCAA’s compensation rules serve the two procompetitive purposes  
identified by the district court: integrating academics with athletics, and  
‘preserving the popularity of the NCAA’s product by promoting its current  
understanding of amateurism.’”168   
Because the NCAA met its burden, the plaintiffs now had to show, as they 
did for the district court, that less restrictive alternatives to the current  
compensation rules could satisfy the NCAA’s procompetitive goals.169  The  
majority opinion recalled the two such alternatives the district court  
identified—athletic scholarships that cover the full cost of attendance and a 
small amount of deferred compensation held in a trust fund—then accepted the 
former but rejected the latter.170  The appellate court reasoned that the evidence 
presented to “the district court indicated that raising the . . . cap [on athletic 
scholarships] to the cost of attendance would have virtually no impact on  
amateurism.”171  Indeed, “Dr. Mark Emmert, the president of the NCAA,  
testified . . . that giving student-athletes scholarships up to their full costs of 
attendance would not violate the NCAA’s principles of amateurism because all 
the money given to students would be going to cover their ‘legitimate costs’ to 
attend school.”172  Furthermore, “nothing in the [trial] record,” the court  
emphasized, “suggested that consumers of college sports would become less 
interested in those sports if athletes’ scholarships covered their full cost of  
attendance, or that an increase in the [scholarship] cap would impede the  
integration of student-athletes into their academic communities.”173  Thus, in 
the appellate court’s view, “[a] compensation cap set at . . . [the] full cost of 
[college] attendance is a substantially less restrictive alternative means of  
accomplishing the NCAA’s legitimate procompetitive purposes.”174 
But the trust fund is a different story, the majority concluded.175  It reasoned 
that in validating the trust fund, the district court failed to recognize “that not 
paying student-athletes is precisely what makes them amateurs.”176  Besides, the 
majority observed, as “far as we can determine, [former CBS Sports executive 
Neal] Pilson’s offhand comment under cross-examination is the sole support for 
                                                 
167. Id. at 1073. 
168. Id. (quoting O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1005). 
169. Id. at 1074. 
170. Id. (citing O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1005–07). 
171. Id. at 1074–75. 
172. Id. at 1075 (citing O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 983). 
173. Id. (citing O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 983).  
174. Id. 
175. See id. at 1076. 
176. Id. 
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the district court’s $5,000 figure.”177  Most importantly, “offering  
student-athletes education-related compensation” is permissible, but “offering 
them cash sums untethered to educational expenses is not”; indeed, “it is a  
quantum leap” from education-related compensation.178 
Thus, the appellate court affirmed the portion of the district court’s  
decision that raised the cap on athletic scholarships to the cost of attendance but 
reversed the portion that created the trust fund for college athletes.179  “The Rule 
of Reason requires that the NCAA permit its schools to provide up to the cost 
of attendance to their student athletes,” the majority explained.180  “It does not 
require more.”181 
Not everybody shared that view.  The majority opinion prompted a partial 
dissent from the panel’s chief judge, who pointed out that “sufficient evidence” 
indicated the trust fund “would not have a significant impact on consumer  
interest in college sports.”182  Besides, players can now receive “Pell [G]rants 
in excess of their cost of attendance,” and Division I tennis recruits can “earn 
up to $10,000 per year in prize money from [competition] before . . . [entering] 
college,” so $5,000 per year in deferred compensation hardly seemed out of 
bounds.183 
Another basis for the partial dissent was that its author credited Mr. Pilson’s 
testimony more than the majority did.184  Noting that Pilson was an expert  
witness, he had testified at length, and the plaintiffs had not challenged his  
qualifications, the dissent reasoned that the majority should not dismiss that  
testimony based on Pilson’s supposedly “offhand” demeanor (suggesting the 
$5,000 figure when pressed) that the appellate panel did not see.185  Finally, the 
dissenting judge also credited the testimony of expert witness Dr. Daniel 
Rascher, who stated that consumer demand typically does not decline when  
athletes are paid, as the Olympics, Major League Baseball, tennis, and rugby 
illustrate.186  Thus, in the view of the dissent, both the raised cap on scholarships 
and the trust fund were permissible means of achieving the NCAA’s  
                                                 
177. Id. at 1078. 
178. Id. 
179. Id. at 1079.  
180. Id.  
181. Id. 
182. Id. at 1080 (Thomas, C.J., concurring and dissenting). 
183. See id. (Thomas, C.J., concurring and dissenting) (citing O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 
955, 974, 1000 (N.D. Cal. 2014), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015). 
184. See id. (Thomas, C.J., concurring and dissenting). 
185. Id. (Thomas, C.J., concurring and dissenting). 
186. Id. at 1081 (Thomas, C.J., concurring and dissenting). 
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procompetitive aims.187 
But the majority opinion carried the day, of course, so only the raised  
scholarship cap is the law at present.  That is a victory of sorts for athletes, who, 
until recently, received scholarships that typically left them several thousand 
dollars short of covering the full cost of attending college.  Moreover, the Ninth 
Circuit, like the district court, rejected the NCAA’s longstanding argument, 
which courts have traditionally adhered to, that player-related NCAA rules are 
not commercial, hence are beyond the reach of antitrust law.   
Any victory by the plaintiffs was modest, though, because the NCAA had 
already authorized the Power Five conferences to allow their members to raise 
the cap on athletic scholarships to cover the full cost of attendance.188  And the 
Ninth Circuit’s veto of the trust fund means that although athletes will now be 
better able to cover their costs, they still will not be compensated adequately for 
the value of their contributions to the wealth and the institutional brands of their 
respective universities.   
Two weeks after the Ninth Circuit issued its decision, the plaintiffs sought 
an en banc rehearing by an eleven-member panel of Ninth Circuit judges.189  The 
full Ninth Circuit panel subsequently denied the plaintiffs’ request for an en 
banc rehearing.190  In March 2016, the plaintiffs filed a petition for certiorari in 
the United States Supreme Court.191  At this writing, in the spring of 2016, the 
cert petition is pending; the Court has yet to decide whether to add the case to 
its calendar for the October 2016 Term.   
                                                 
187. Id. at 1083 (Thomas, C.J., concurring and dissenting). 
188. See New, supra note 62. 
189. Audrey C. Sheetz, Student-Athletes vs. NCAA:Preserving Amateurism in College Sports 
Amidst the Fight for Player Compensation, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 865, 881 (2016).  After the plaintiffs 
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191. Steve Berkowitz, O’Bannon Plaintiffs Ask Supreme Court to Take Case, USA TODAY (March 
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Jon Solomon, NCAA Seeks Extension to Petition Supreme Court in O’Bannon Case, CBS SPORTS 
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In appealing to the Supreme Court, the plaintiffs have taken a risk because 
the Court could reverse the decisions of the two lower courts and hold that the 
NCAA’s prohibition on payments to athletes beyond the limits of the traditional 
scholarship complies with the dictates of antitrust law.  In that circumstance, not 
only would the plaintiffs lose the opportunity to expand compensation  
opportunities for college athletes, but the plaintiffs’ counsel would lose the 
nearly $46 million in costs and fees that a federal magistrate has awarded 
them.192  But if the Court accepts the case, the NCAA would also face a risk, 
because the Court could hold that the challenged prohibition deserves no  
deference under antitrust law and perhaps even that a trust fund is a permissible 
means of compensating college athletes for the use of their names, images, and 
likenesses.193 
The future contours of the athlete-institution relationship are too important 
to be left to courts and antitrust lawyers, though.  Educators should shape that 
relationship because they work for educational institutions and care about the 
athletes as students.  Part V unveils one educator’s design for a modern  
amateurism model that seeks to serve both athletes and higher education. 
V. MODERNIZING AMATEURISM  
As Section II shows, amateurism has evolved over time and no longer fits 
the definition it had at the NCAA’s founding in 1906.  Two veteran observers 
of college sports, a sociologist and an economist, respectively, write in this  
regard: “[i]n short, amateurism in intercollegiate athletics is whatever the 
NCAA says it is.”194  Accordingly, amateurism need not conjure up images of 
cricket matches or shooting parties at Downton Abbey.  Modern Americans can 
define it to fit modern conditions, while retaining its historic opposition to  
athletic employment.  The modern amateur could be defined as one who does 
not play for a professional team in his or her collegiate sport, does not receive a 
salary (or a share of gate receipts) for playing the collegiate sport, but only  
reimbursement for educational costs and basic living expenses, is a full-time 
student in good standing, and, aside from having an athletic scholarship, is  
subject to the same rights and responsibilities as his or her classmates.195  An 
amateurism redefined along such lines could liberate college athletes from  
                                                 
192. Berkowitz, supra note 191. 
193. Id.; see also Solomon, supra note 191. 
194. ANDREW ZIMBALIST & ALLEN SACK, THOUGHTS ON AMATEURISM, THE O’BANNON CASE 
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3/04/drake-statement-obannon1.doc. 
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perennially persnickety NCAA rules regarding agents, endorsements, and entry 
into a professional draft.196 
Amateurism is worth retaining in concept because it links athletics to  
academics.  As long as academic institutions sponsor the teams, athletes must 
be required to pursue a degree and nudged to nurture interests and abilities  
unrelated to sport.  Education is about long-term human development; hence, 
institutions that use athletes for short-term benefit, then discard them after four 
years without a degree or job skills, deserve our disgust and condemnation.  But 
if the employment model governed college sports, athletes would have  
little or no incentive to study, because they would view themselves as  
professionals, and coaches would feel emboldened to occupy all their players’ 
time with athletic obligations because the players would be employees, not  
students.  Nobody would have to make sure they went to class or study hall or 
received remedial help if necessary.  And the percentage who found  
employment in professional sports would still be negligible.  Presumably, they 
would leave college with more money in the bank than they do now, but that 
money would not sustain them through what would likely be a lifetime of  
low-wage employment.  Thus, despite all the problems associated with  
America’s marriage of sport to higher education, retaining but modernizing it is 
preferable to a divorce that would make the athletes employees and “college 
sports” an oxymoron. 
In preserving amateurism, though, one must take account of Professor  
Allison’s sobering reminder “that when people live in dire material poverty . . . 
to offer them amateur institutions . . . is to mock their condition.”197  Applied to 
American college sports, this statement means that modern amateurism should 
account for the commercial success of the enterprise and the economically  
disadvantaged circumstances from which many college athletes, notably  
football and basketball players, come.  Accordingly, modern amateurism should 
include the following components:198 
 
1.  Athletic scholarships that remain in effect until graduation 
                                                 
196. See id. at 590. 
197. ALLISON, supra note 4, at 161. 
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(five years total) and cannot be revoked unless the recipient 
voluntarily withdraws from the team, “fails to meet  
academic requirements necessary . . . to retain” the  
scholarship, or “engages in serious misconduct” punishable 
by institutional rules and applicable to all students;199 
2.  Athletic scholarships that cover the full cost of college  
attendance, as determined by federal student financial aid 
guidelines;200 
3.  Deferred compensation, namely, a trust fund, comprised of 
revenues from the use of players’ names, images, and  
likenesses, in an equal amount per player and equal in 
amount to a maximum Pell Grant, but subject to an annual 
inflation allowance.  Players could only withdraw funds at 
graduation or the completion of their collegiate eligibility 
and only for educational purposes, such as completing a 
Bachelor’s degree or pursuing a graduate degree;201 
4.  The right to endorse products and businesses and to sign 
autographs, as long as an athlete’s institution does not  
arrange for the endorsement, is not mentioned in it, and no 
identifying mark of an institution (e.g., logo, football  
jersey, etc.) is displayed in the endorsement;202 
5.  The right to retain an agent to explore opportunities in  
professional sports (or the endorsement opportunities  
referenced above) and to negotiate a professional sports 
contract on the athlete’s behalf.  Under this right, the athlete 
shall not be deemed a professional, hence ineligible for  
college sports, unless the athlete signs or verbally commits 
to an enforceable contract with, or receives money from, a 
professional team.  An athlete who declares his or her  
eligibility for a professional draft can be drafted, yet remain 
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eligible for college sports provided the athlete does not sign 
or verbally commit to an enforceable legal contract and  
informs the institution and the NCAA of his or her intent to 
return to college within thirty days after the draft date;203 
6.  The right to transfer from one institution to another under 
the same rules as non-athlete students and be eligible to 
compete immediately at the new institution, provided the 
athlete is in good academic standing at the original  
institution and no evidence exists of “poaching” by the new 
institution.204  
 
Adoption of the above proposals, either voluntarily by the NCAA or as a 
result of federal legislation, would go a long way toward harmonizing sport with 
higher education.  These measures would modernize amateurism, thereby  
preserving a beloved American tradition of athletic skill demonstrated by  
full-time, legitimate university students, while honoring the athletes’  
contributions to their institutions by better meeting their financial needs.   
VI. CONCLUSION 
The NCAA’s insistence on amateurism for athletes, while coaches and  
administrators reap the college sports industry’s bountiful harvest has left  
amateurism a “cynical hoax[]” and a “legalistic confection[]” in Taylor 
Branch’s florid prose.205  But it need not be so.  The proposals offered here 
would strengthen the bond between sport and higher education, while also  
honoring athletes’ contributions to institutional wealth and visibility and  
enabling them to complete their educations in modest material comfort.   
Otherwise, the growing wealth gap between the college sports industry and its 
primary workers is likely to validate the employment model, which would sever 
any meaningful connection between “college” and “sports” for athletes and  
institutions alike. 
                                                 
203. Id. at 9–10; see also LOPIANO ET AL., supra note 199, at 4.  Only the thirty-day right of return 
is not part of the Drake Group’s position on this subject. 
204. See LOPIANO ET AL., supra note 199, at 2–4. 
205. Branch, supra note 10. 
